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| "We now know that pain is 100% produced by the brain!" |
Unfortunately I can't embed it, can't find the code anywhere. So click on the link to see it on YouTube - well worth the minor effort. ---> LINK
Views of a naturalist professional human primate social groomer and neuromatrician
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| "We now know that pain is 100% produced by the brain!" |
11. Even though I'd never done such a thing before, it worked. So I guess it can be done. Sample of one. Now that I've done it once, next time (should there be a next time - there may not ever have to be a next time) it should be easier. (Optimistic thought)
- emotions (HATING pain, determination, focus, no-nonsense, I WON'T put up with this, I WILL construct a boundary between me and this Pain) as fuel
- information (I won't die if I try this, pain is just my brain being freaked out about something, it's not likely any big deal, it's only pain, I didn't injure anything lately) as message containers
- social context/therapeutic contact (I'm appalled by so much of what I see in the world, and my own body is where I should have the right to feel safe (dammit)/ my therapist is here to help me, I have locus of control) as delivery chutes
“Monkeys, and other animals, groom each other often with a marked reduction in stress. Touch is good, and one doesn’t need to wrap it up in pseudoscientific nonsense for it to be beneficial.”
"Thank you for saying that Mark; I’ve been saying the same thing for years. I call it “human primate social grooming.” Most human primate social grooming professions/professionals dislike the term, for some weird reason. Oh well.
Diane, human primate social groomer and manual therapist with a PT license to touch people."
"Well, strictly speaking, any profession that is licensed to touch human beings for whatever reason including hair dressers, dentists, pedicurists and medicine, could all be considered human primate social groomers, I think.
It’s the “WHY-we-touch” that shakes the idea into layers, I think.
Those who touch to get a specific job done, like get a tooth out, get a toenail clipped or a callous scraped off, or hair cut, or appendix out etc., i.e., have an obvious, clear, objective purpose for both patient and practitioner to focus on; these practitioners have the option of being ’something more than just’ human primate social groomers. We could call these people “operator model” human primate social groomers.
Those who groom humans specifically to help them with nebulous perceptions and experiences of stress/pain, are (fundamentally) practitioners of what I would call the “interactor model” of human primate social grooming.
Could a desire to be more “operator” than “interactor”, to have some externalized reason for treating no matter how imaginary, i.e., a treatment “concept”, be a big reason *why* human primate social groomers (and now I’m talking about only the ones like me, interactor-model ones who touch to relieve stress and reduce pain perception/experience) made up (and still make up!) crazy ideas like acupuncture meridians? Trigger points? Subluxations? Untestable and unprovable? then go on to develop complicated ways of treating them?
I’m content just treating human primates with pain problems nowadays, supported by pain science and neuroscience, rather than trying to learn to treat crazy concepts some other groomer(s) invented once-upon-a-time for fun and profit. I guess this makes me a full-on, out-of-the-closet, interactor-model human primate social groomer on the lowest possible rung of the human practitioner hierarchy; oddly, though, I find it the most comfortable place to be, the most science-based, with the least distance to fall.
Diane, human primate social groomer and manual therapist with a PT license to touch people/many opinions on the matter"
First Law of Human Primate Social Grooming: Do No Nocicepting
•The ecological self is the self as perceived with respect to the physical environment: I am the person here in this place, engaged in this particular activity.
•The interpersonal self, which appears from earliest infancy just as the ecological self does, is specified by species-specific signals of emotional rapport and communication: I am the person who is engaged, here, in this particular human interchange.
•The extended self is based primarily on our personal memories and anticipations: I am the person who had certain specific experiences, who regularly engages in certain specific and familiar routines.
• The private self appears when children first notice that some of their experiences are not directly shared with other people: I am, in principle, the only person who can feel this unique and particular pain.
• The conceptual self or ’self-concept’ draws its meaning from the network of assumptions and theories in which it is embedded, just as all other concepts do. Some of those theories concern social roles (husband, professor, American), some postulate more or less hypothetical internal entities (the soul, the unconscious mind, mental energy, the brain, the liver), and some establish socially significant dimensions of difference (intelligence, attractiveness, wealth). There is a remarkable variety in what people believe about themselves, and not all of it is true.
"..tends to be suspicious of what it sees as the slippery, evocative world of metaphor and imagery. If something can be understood, it can be understood clearly and unambiguously, says the intellect. An intimation of understanding that does not quite reveal itself, that remains shrouded or indistinct, is, to d-mode, only an impoverished kind of understanding; one that should either be forced to explain itself more fully, or treated with disdain. Poetry does not capture anything that cannot ultimately be better, more clearly rendered in prose, and rhetoric is a poor cousin of reasoned explanation."
"It is in the nature of language to segment and analyse. The world seen through language is one that is perforated, capable of being gently pulled apart into concepts that seem...self-evidently 'real' or 'natural', and which can be analysed in terms of the relationships between these concepts. Much of traditional science works so well precisely because the world of which it treats is this kind of world. But when the mind turns its attention to situations that are ecological or 'systemic', too intricate to be decomposed in this way without serious misrepresentation, the limitations of d-mode's linguistic, analytical approach are quickly reached. Any situation that is organic rather than mechanical is likely to be of this sort. The new 'sciences' of chaos and complexity are in part a response to the realisation that d-mode is in principle unequal to the task of explaining systems as complicated as the weather, or the behaviour of animals in the natural world. Along with the rise of these new sciences must come a re-evaluation of the slower ways of knowing; of intuition as an essential complement to reason.
"poetic sensibility has the ability to reset or create our agenda; to uncover issues and reveal concerns, perhaps in unexpected quarters, or surprising ways. By allowing ourselves to become absorbed in some present experience without any sense of seeking or grasping at all, we can be reminded of aspects of life that may have been eclipsed by more urgent business, and of ways of knowing and seeing that are, perhaps, more intimate and less egocentric (...) There is a kind of knowing which is essentially indirect, sideways, allusive and symbolic; which hints and evokes, touches and moves, in ways that resist explication. And it is accessed not through earnest manipulation of abstraction, but through leisurely contemplation of the particular.(...) For a person whose apprehension is under the spell of this attitude, the immediate context commands his interest so completely that nothing else can exist beside and apart from it (...) One slips away from self-concern and preoccupation into the sheer presence of the thing, the scene, the sound itself."
"You do not need to leave your room. Remain sitting at your table and listen. Do not even listen, simply wait. Do not even wait, be quite still and solitary. The world will freely offer itself to you to be unmasked, it has no choice, it will roll in ecstasy at your feet."
"If you hold to Nature, to the simplicity that is in her, to the small detail that scarcely one man sees, which can so unexpectedly grow into something great and boundless; if you have this love for insignificant things and seek, simply as one who serves, to win the confidence of what seems to be poor: then everything will become easier for you, more coherent and somehow more conciliatory, not perhaps in the understanding, which lags wondering behind, but in your innermost conciousness, wakefulness and knowing."
"The fourth manner of paying attention which I want to describe in this chapter is a way of seeing through one's own perceptual assumptions. It is called mindfulness. The extent to which the world-as-perceived is a mirror of our preconceptions and our preoccupations (...) is easy to underestimate. It takes an effort to see what is happening, because our beliefs are dissolved in the very organs we use to sense."He follows with an example of tasting saliva that is in your mouth, noting its pleasant quality, then spitting some into a glass and retasting it, noting how one's perception of it immediately changes into something less positive.
"The spit hasn't changed, only the interpretation."
"Being 'old' is not just a biological phenomenon; how one goes about 'being old' depends on one's (largely unconscious) image of what it is like, what it means, to be old, and this in turn reflects a whole raft of both cultural assumptions and individual experiences. Ellen Langer and colleagues at Harvard U. have examined the effect on elderly people of their own vicarious experiences, as children, of ways of being old. They reasoned that children may unconsciously pick up images of old age from their own grandparents - which they might then recapitulate as they themselves get older. Specifically, they surmised that the younger their grandparents were when children first got to know them, the more 'youthful' would be the image of old age that the children would unconsciously absorb, and the more positively they would therefore approach their own ageing. (...) it was found that those elderly people who had lived with a grandparent when they themselves were toddlers were rated as more alert, more active and more independent than those whose first experience of living with a grandparent had not occurred till they were teenagers (...) it looks as if the ways in which different people age depends quite directly on the assumptions and beliefs they have picked up in their own childhoods about what it is to be old."
"The unconscious assumptions that people stir into their experience are often hard to alter, but sometimes they can be changed just by a suggestion, especially if it comes from some kind of an authority figure. The experience of pain, for instance, can be dramatically altered, in normal conscious subjects, simply by telling them to think of it differently. When a group of people who had volunteered to suffer some mild electric shocks were told to think of the shocks as "new physiological sensations," they were less anxious, and had lower pulse rates, than those who were not so instructed. In another study, hospital patients who were about to undergo major surgery were encouraged to realise how much the experience of pain depends on the way people interpret it. They were reminded, for example, that a bruise sustained during a football match, or a finger cut while preparing dinner for a large group of friends, would not hurt as much as similar injuries in less intense situations. And they were shown analogous ways of reinterpreting the experience of being in hospital so that it was less threatening. Patients who were given this training took fewer pain relievers and sedatives after their operations, and tended to be discharge sooner, than an equivalent group that was untrained.My bolds.
These experiments demonstrate how other people may be able to rescue us from what Langer refers to as 'premature cognitive committments' - help us become aware of the assumptions that we had dissolved in perception, and contemplate alternative ways of construing the situation."
"Mindfulness involves observing one's own experience carefully enough to be able to spot any misconceptions that may inadvertently have crept in. There are a number of ways in which this quality of mindfulness towards the activity of our own minds can be cultivated, though all involve slowing down the onrush of mental activity, and trying to focus conscious awareness on the world of sensations, rather than jumping on the first interpretation that comes along and hurtling off in the direction of decision and action. Mindfulness can be taught directly, as a form of secular meditation, for example. (...) "The essence of the state is to 'be' fully in the present moment, without judging or evaluating it, without reflecting backwards on past memories, without looking forward to anticipate the future, as in anxious worry, and without attempting to 'problem-solve' or otherwise avoid any unplesant aspects of the immediate situation. In this state one is highly aware and focused on the reality of the present moment, 'as it is', accepting and acknowledging it is its full 'reality' without immediately engaging in discursive thought about it, without trying to work out how to change it, and without drifting off into a state of diffuse thinking focused on somewhere else or some other time.. The mindful state is associated with a lack of elaborative processing involving thoughts that are essentially about the currently experienced, its implications, further meanings, or the need for related action. Rather mindfulness involves direct and immediate experience of the present situation."(Jon Kabat-Zinn)"
"I don't know if I can articulate this because it's still sort of seeping around in there is that most of us feel that we are what our conscious mind tells us we are. That question you asked about the free will and about someone said what your unconscious is doing is not part of 'you' - I think that we sense only what we sense. We sense ourselves as starting an idea, having a thought, making plans, etc etc. and we really don't see that that facility arises out of the same cognitive stew that causes all these perceptual illusions in general. And somehow, if you were to take a look at sort of western thought, it really is all about the mind-body thing. All the major questions arise out of the conception that the mind is somehow a separate entity. I mean there's a book by John Searle the philosopher - he has a whole book called The Mind, and he covers all the various kinds of theories, but none of them make any sense if you think about it. Because way down deep the mind is simply a higher level function that we can't conceptualize, just the same way as you said it's more than the sum of its parts I think you said.. this whole idea of emergence is really impossible to visually see - in other words you realize that if you take a chocolate chip and you take a piece of flour and take water, there is no embedded cake in there.. there's nothing - there's just chocolate and flour but we know you can make a cake. Well the cake is material. You can still see it. But in this case the problem is, the problem is what the brain generates is immaterial, that we can't see, yet does exist. I mean exists in the same way that pain exists. Pain isn't anywhere. The brain doesn't experience pain in the neurons I'm suffering. When you stub your toe there's no neuron that goes ouch. It occurs at a higher level. The problem I haven't figured out yet which I think might be the next project is, there needs to be a metaphor for understanding higher level function when seen from a lower level that will allow people to get rid of this distinction and argument about the mind and free will and causation. I think these are all problems of language that arise out of misconceptions what the mind is. Which is sort of what I think might be the next project."
"You pointed out in your book that we don't think pain is something mystical or magical just because it can't be localized - it's emergent - yet somehow it seems natural to look at our mind and feel that it has to be somehow different."
"Right. And I haven't been able to think of it because maybe I'm too dense, but there must be some analogy or metaphoric analogy where you can say, well just as pain exists but is undetectable, the mind exists, but it exists arising out of stuff that we cannot control so even though it feels like it's separate and also feels like it's in control in some sense it also feels like it's you, and feels like a self - these are all phenomena that are undetectable but necessary - I don't want to use the word illusion because illusion implies it doesn't exist - but on the other hand it is an illusion if you mean by illusion you can't see or taste or smell or touch it. It's an illusion without being an illusion."
"Earlier on I asked the question, "What would be the possible benefits of "a feeling of knowing" that is actually false?" This brings us to a consideration of our brain's reward systems, and how they interact and influence our thoughts.
We know that there are extensive connections between the pleasure rewards systems, emotions, and the opioid peptides in the brain. We have talked about in the past the mesolimbic-dopamine system, which is a key component of the brain reward circuitry that originates in the upper brainstem. It, not surprisingly, seems to use dopamine as its key neurotransmitter. This mesolimbic dopamine system connects to the parts of the brain that are involved in emotion and cognition, including parts of the frontal lobes, and the nucleus accumbens which is thought to be involved in addiction. It's been shown that brain mediated rewards cause behaviours to persist, including addictions.
So you have to wonder, how is this related to the feeling of knowing? Dr. Burton gives an example in the book, of a person faced with a charging lion, who climbs up in a tree and survives. After the person escapes he has the feeling that he has learned something. And if you make these sorts of decisions repeatedly, you will probably have a positive feeling of "correctness" that becomes linked to that behaviour.
Dr. Burton argues that the feeling of knowing and feelings of familiarity are integral to learning."

I don't think so. There is a layer of "brain" all around the outside of the body, a.k.a. skin, with fibres that go straight up to the insular cortex.1,2,3,4 We could consider manual therapies as altering the nervous system through THIS organ - I think all of the manual therapies you named do this anyway to a large extent, yet there is a conceptual void that needs filling; long ago manual therapies were named for the mesoderm (deep to the skin sensors) they were supposedly targeting (e.g. myofascial) or the sort of physical movement needed to perform them (e.g. massage, mobilization). These sorts of archaic designations deflect accurate therapeutic understanding from including the perspectives that patients' own unique nervous systems may have, keep our constructs off track, bias our self-image toward being PHYSICAL therapists instead of being physical THERAPISTS.
I doubt the actual therapy procedures, the physicality of them, are discreditable. These seem to be something humans evolved doing in order to help/comfort one another, cognitively consolidated action memeplexes that appear to stem from some deep ancestral well of primate social grooming. However, the constructs that attempt to explain and inform their use do nothing but describe such treatment as something we the treatment heroes "do" unto others. This perpetuates confusion, maintains invisibility/disregard of the highly variable nervous systems at the receiving end of the interactions as passive recipients, does nothing to consider or include the highly active role that nervous systems play in their own recovery by first accepting as non-threatening, then responding to, exteroceptive input.
Manual therapy ranging from skin touch only to active skin stretch to deeper pressure into underlying bones, muscles, neural tunnels, what have you, at varying speeds, should always be kept within our scope, but framed instead as varying kinds of exteroceptive input into a living perceiving system. Rather than being framed so strictly in biomechanical language, with its attendant and unavoidable misconceptions of cause and effect, the effects produced by manual therapies should be more carefully read as responses by the patient's living perceiving system. This necessitates seeing a patient's nervous system as more of a verb than a noun. This necessitates developing abilities to stay one step ahead of that nervous system, guiding it toward better behavior/output, not overtreating the mesodermal anatomy of it, or holding that foremost in our minds.
I'm all for retaining, but renaming, all forms of manual therapy interventions as a necessary part of their long overdue upgrade; new manual therapy names should include and reflect modern pain and nervous system concepts, and a sense of the interactivity of two nervous systems working together at every level to help one of them reduce pain and improve function/freedom. I would predict that as the perception of them shifted in us, the users of these therapies, the balance of usage of them would too; I think a trend more toward less intensive and slower forms would develop.
1. Unmyelinated tactile afferents signal touch and project to insular cortex; Nature Neuroscience (2003); H. Olausson, Y. Lamarre, H, Backlund, C. Morin, B.G. Wallin, G. Starck, S. Ekholm, I. Strigo, K. Worsley, Ã….B. Vallbo, and M.C. Bushnell.
2. Pain Mechanisms: Labeled Lines Versus Convergence in Central Processing, Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 2003; A.D. (Bud) Craig.
3. Antero-posterior somatotopy of innocuous cooling activation focus in human dorsal posterior insular cortex, open access 2005; L.H. Hua, I.A. Strigo, L.C. Baxter, S.C. Johnson, A.D. (Bud) Craig.
4. The Integrative Action of the Autonomic Nervous System: Neurobiology of Homeostasis 2006; W. Jänig.